In a public show of reflexivity and self-assessment, Anonymous addresses the in-fighting that has unfortunately been characterizing it lately. @Anon_Central posted the above video along with the transcription (after the jump).
Continue readingMonth: September 2011
anti-censorship in network infrastructure
With AntiSec—and attendant censorship countermeasures—in full swing, Telex seemed like an appropriate subject. In a nutshell, Telex offers a response to online censorship by placing anti-censorship technology into the Internet’s core network infrastructure, rendering it easy to distribute and difficult to detect and prevent. Governments tend to use firewalls in their network to block traffic or access to forbidden sites. Telex is different from previous anti-censorship systems in that it operates within the infrastructure at ISP points and non-blocked portions of the Internet, as opposed to network end points.
This “end-to-middle” proxying makes the system robust against censorship countermeasures. Furthermore, it emphasizes evading detection so that a censor may be circumvented without being alerted, complementing proxy and relay services like Tor. Telex employs and repurposes deep-packet inspection in its anti-censorship measures. Telex also does away with individual encryption keys or IP addresses that need to be communicated to users in advance, since the censor can block the system if it discovers this information. Telex is described, in short, as a “state-level response to state-level censorship” (Telex.cc).
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